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GERARD E. LYNCH

Frye and Lafler: No Big Deal
The only surprise about the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Missouri v.
Frye1 and Lafler v. Cooper2 is that there were four dissents. The decisions are
straightforward recognitions that the defendants in those cases received
unquestionably derelict representation, to their considerable prejudice. The
decisions do not represent a novelty in the law, but rather continue the
longstanding recognition by the courts that “plea bargaining” is an integral
part of our criminal justice system—indeed, I have argued at length that it is
our criminal justice system3—and that minimal competence of defense lawyers
in dealing with that process is at least as important as competence in
investigation or trial. Nor is there reason to believe that the decisions will
present administrative problems for federal habeas courts. Most of the Circuits
have recognized such claims for years, and the lower courts have experienced
no more difficulty assessing plea-bargaining ineffective assistance of counsel
claims than similar claims regarding trial performance.
Let’s start with the basics. In most cases, in most American jurisdictions,
the actual system of justice is not the one we read about in civics books and
thrill to in the occasional real or fictional courtroom drama. In our real justice
system, the prosecutor is the effective adjudicator of guilt or innocence and the
de facto sentencing authority. As Justice Kennedy’s opinions for the Court
recognize, approximately ninety-five percent of criminal convictions, state and
federal, result from guilty pleas, not from trials.4 To hold that a defendant’s

1.
2.
3.
4.

No. 10-444 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-444.pdf
(to be reported at 132 S. Ct. 1399).
No. 10-209 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-209.pdf
(to be reported at 132 S. Ct. 1376).
See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117
(1998).
Frye, slip op. at 7 (majority opinion); Lafler, slip op. at 11 (majority opinion).
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right to effective assistance of counsel, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, is
inapplicable to plea bargaining would be to hold in effect that only five percent
of defendants facing the might of the state’s criminal justice apparatus are
entitled to competent representation. Requiring competent performance by
defense counsel in the most important function that counsel performs in the
vast majority of criminal cases does not reflect some kind of “sporting-chance
theory of criminal law,” as Justice Scalia would have it.5 Our criminal justice
system is most certainly no sport, unless your idea of sport is shooting fish in a
barrel. Defendants usually plead because they usually are guilty, the
prosecution usually can prove it, and the statutory penalties upon conviction
are usually so severe that even a defendant who questions whether the
authorities really can prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt usually has no
realistic choice but to accept the “deal” offered by the prosecutor. Seen in this
light, plea “bargaining” is not an aberration, but is our de facto system of
criminal justice, and most pleas reflect precious little “bargaining” (in the sense
of negotiation or haggling) and are hardly “bargains” (in the sense of cheap
dispositions). The resulting sentences are not in any meaningful sense
“discounts” from the system’s intended outcomes: they are the intended
outcomes of a system that is designed to produce pleas in large part by
threatening defendants who go to trial with extreme sentences.6
Indeed, the Supreme Court has already recognized—and regulated—this
system. Prosecutorial promises that induce guilty pleas are enforceable,7 and
incompetent advice that leads a defendant to plead guilty when he would
otherwise go to trial violates the Sixth Amendment.8 The question decided in
Frye and Lafler is only whether that same Sixth Amendment right is violated
when ineffective assistance leads a defendant who would have taken a plea
offer to go to trial instead.
From the standpoint of the actual system, this is, or should be, a nobrainer. Since virtually all defendants plead guilty, usually in return for some
sentencing concession as compared with the “going rate” after trial, the right
recognized in Frye and Lafler is in fact more important than the converse right
recognized in Hill v. Lockhart.9 While Justice Scalia argues that a defendant
cannot be prejudiced by going to trial because, having ultimately been fairly
convicted and tried and given a lawful sentence, he got only what he

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
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Lafler, slip op. at 13 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Lynch, supra note 3, at 2129-36.
See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
Id.
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deserved,10 that objection is premised on the essentially fictive notion that the
sentencing outcomes after trial are in fact just. In reality, post-trial sentencing
exposures are excessive by design and serve almost exclusively to induce
defendants to plead. Lawyerly dereliction that causes a defendant to go to trial
rather than accept a favorable plea offer results in the imposition of a de facto
sentencing penalty on that defendant, as compared with the normal sentence
that would be imposed on the ninety-five percent of his peers whose conviction
results from a plea of guilty.
Are there difficulties with the rule of Frye and Lafler? Sure. Lawyers differ
widely in skill and judgment. Just where along that spectrum do we draw the
line between the acceptable and the unprofessional? These were easy cases: in
Frye the lawyer’s dereliction in failing to convey a plea offer was clear and
fundamental, and in Lafler the state conceded that counsel’s advice was
deficient. But what if the defendant argues that his lawyer was negligent in
failing to present mitigating arguments to the prosecutor in order to elicit a
favorable plea offer? Or that the lawyer was too tough—or not tough enough—
as a negotiator? Such claims are not likely to meet with much success in the
courts. Decisions about how to handle plea negotiations—what information
should be shared with the prosecutor, which arguments advanced and which
withheld for trial use, whether an offer is likely to be withdrawn or improved
as trial approaches, and ultimately whether the chances of outright acquittal are
sufficiently high to be worth the risk of an enhanced sentence after trial—are
questions of tactics and judgment that turn on exquisite factual nuances that
are difficult to reconstruct accurately after the fact. Even reasonable lawyers
working together on a case and sharing the exact same information will
disagree about these issues. After an unsuccessful trial, it is easy to say that the
defendant would have been better off taking a plea. These are, however, exactly
the same problems we face in evaluating claims of ineffective assistance at trial.
They are resolved by taking a fairly hard line against after-the-fact criticism of
anything that can be characterized as a matter of tactical decision.11 The same
will be true in criticism of lawyers’ plea-bargaining judgments. Only in cases
similar to Frye and Lafler, where a defendant can show that his lawyer’s failure
in negotiation was indefensible, will relief be appropriate.12

10.
11.
12.

Lafler, slip op. at 11 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court has already said as much. See Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733 (2011).
See, e.g., Mask v. McGinnis, 233 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the defense lawyer’s
failure to inform the prosecutor that the defendant was not a persistent violent felon subject
to enhanced penalties, where the prosecutor’s harsh plea offer was predicated on a mistaken
belief that the defendant was, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel).
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Similarly, it will be easy for disgruntled convicts to claim, falsely, that they
were not told of the plea offer. But again, this issue is similar to many claims of
trial ineffectiveness. Like plea bargaining, much of the work essential to trial
success takes place outside the courtroom, off the record. Convicted defendants
often claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate witnesses
of whose possible value the client advised the lawyer. Even more closely
analogous, prisoners very commonly claim that their lawyers coerced them not
to testify, or did not tell them of their right to take the stand in their own
defense. Courts routinely adjudicate these claims, and whatever can be said
about such cases, they certainly have not led to widespread defendant victories.
Finally, we know that the heavens will not fall as a result of Frye and Lafler,
because the cases’ rule is “new” only to the Supreme Court. The Second Circuit
has held, at least since 1996, that defense lawyers must give their clients
competent advice about whether to accept a plea.13 So, indeed, have virtually all
the other Circuits.14 From the very first 1996 case, the Second Circuit has been
prepared to give relief in the form of enforcing the offer, where the defendant
can show that his lawyer failed to behave professionally and that he would have
taken the offer if it had been given. I have been able to readily locate about a
dozen cases in our court in which the issue has been litigated (but not many in
which a defendant has succeeded).15 No doubt there are more that have been
dealt with summarily, or decided in the district courts and not appealed. Those
numbers are not insubstantial, but they are dwarfed by the number of cases in
which, as in Hill v. Lockhart, defendants who pled guilty complained of their
counsel’s ineffective advice and claimed they would have been better advised to
go to trial, and even more so by the number of claims of ineffective assistance
at trial. The court has been comfortably able to deal with those cases, which
have rarely provoked much controversy. The heavens are still up, at least over
New York, Connecticut, and Vermont.

13.
14.
15.
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See Boria v. Keane, 99 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 1996).
See, e.g., Williams v. Jones, 571 F.3d 1086, 1090 n.3 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing cases in ten
circuits with similar holdings).
See, e.g, United States v. Raysor, 647 F.3d 491 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Brown, 623
F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2010); Puglisi v. United States, 586 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 2009); Davis v.
Greiner, 428 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Feyrer, 333 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2003);
Pham v. United States, 317 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2003); Aeid v. Bennett, 296 F.3d 58 (2d Cir.
2002); Mask, 233 F.3d at 132; United States v. Carmichael, 216 F.3d 224 (2d Cir. 2000);
Purdy v. United States, 208 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2000); Cullen v. United States, 194 F.3d 401 (2d
Cir. 1999); United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 1998); Boria, 99 F.3d at 492.
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